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VIEW: Musharraf’s difficult options —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Musharraf can either revive the government’s ties with the MMA or cultivate new partnership with the PPP, if not the ARD. These options have implications for his domestic politics and interaction with the international system

A weak and divided opposition does not mean the government is strong. The inability of opposition political parties to adopt a joint political posture and launch a nationwide agitation is a major relief to the Musharraf government. But neither does the government enjoy widespread popular support nor the opposition is ineffectual because it is facing a popular government.

The problems of the opposition can be attributed partly to the power structure in Islamabad, which restrains the role of the opposition, and partly to intra-opposition political dynamics. Political institutions like the parliament and the federal cabinet led by the prime minister are peripheral to power management. Power is concentrated in the presidency backed, strongly, by the army, intelligence agencies and top bureaucracy. Their primary support base is the military-bureaucratic structure, which is relatively immune from day-to-day political pressures. The presidency has created a political support system by co-opting a section of the political elite and establishing partnerships or working relations with others by offering state patronage and sharing power on its terms.

Indeed, the approval by parliament of the Women’s Protection Bill (WPB) shows the centrality of the presidency to political management. The PML leadership wanted to accommodate the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) on the WPB but the presidency decided to set aside objections by the MMA and get the bill passed by parliament. Even now the PML leadership is making efforts to seek the presidency’s approval for some accommodation with the MMA.

The elitist power structure in Pakistan is not vulnerable to pressures from below. Its immunity from political pressure from outside official circles is strengthened by the presidency’s down-to-earth approach to political matters to protect its centrality to the political process. It is willing to accommodate political demands directly or through the co-opted political leadership (the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, for example). The latter interacts with the opposition on a regular basis. However, the presidency holds the veto power. The other channel used by the presidency for political management is its army-intelligence/bureaucratic affiliates.

The opposition faces problems in challenging such an entrenched system. What makes their task difficult is that the presidency uses a multi-pronged strategy to protect its interests. This includes negotiations on the contentious issues, use of carrot and stick methods, and exploitation of intra-opposition divisions.

The opposition’s other problems stem from its internal dynamics. Major political parties and their alliances are umbrella organisations. Each alliance includes leaders and parties with divergent political outlooks, making it difficult for the leadership to pull the alliance in one direction. The MMA is a good example of this problem because its two major parties, Jama’at-e Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman Group (JUIF) diverge on the strategies for dealing with the Musharraf government. The JI chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, known for strong anti-government rhetoric, wants the MMA members of the National Assembly to resign at the earliest and take on the government in the streets. The JUIF chief, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, known for a more pragmatic perspective, shares Qazi’s antipathy towards Musharraf but does not think that resignations would serve their political agenda.

Qazi’s position on the resignation issue has weakened because the Pakistan People’s Party has also argued for delaying resignations. However, Qazi is insisting on resignations and agitation. His attempted Lahore-Gujarat march on November 31 was meant to create a political environment that would force his MMA partners and other political parties to join him.

But the JI alone is not in a position to launch a sustained nationwide agitation. Even if the JUIF and other MMA partners join Qazi, his desire to pursue a nationwide agitation may not materialise at this stage. He needs the cooperation of the mainstream political parties and a shared anti-government strategy — JI cannot force a situation on others.

The other opposition collection, the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) also faces internal disharmony due to divergent political priorities of its major partners, the PPP and the PMLN. Though they share strong anti-Musharraf sentiments, the PMLN is focused on challenging Musharraf for understandable reasons. The PPP is pursuing a pluralist approach towards the government. There are credible reports of interaction between the PPP leadership and the presidency’s interlocutors for political accommodation. Therefore, the PPP wants to hold back on agitation for some time. It is not expected to accommodate Musharraf until it obtains ironclad guarantees for fair and free elections where all political parties have equal opportunity to compete. Irrespective of the outcome of the PPP-presidency interaction, the threatened opposition agitation may not materialise for some time now.

However, if the opposition is divided, neither is the ruling coalition better off; it too suffers from internal disharmony. Intra-PML problems have been kept under check by periodic intervention of Musharraf. If the presidency and the PPP work out a political arrangement, the ruling PML is expected to undergo a major transformation. There are elements in the PML, especially the Chaudhrys of Gujarat, who are averse to the PPP and want to rehabilitate cooperative interaction with the MMA. Any political settlement between the PPP and the presidency will cause a major political realignment in the PML. It is also expected to have implications for the PPP’s relations with the PMLN.

These developments have enabled Musharraf to retain the political initiative, but his choices are limited. The political status quo in Islamabad has become untenable. With the current breach with the MMA the government is more isolated than ever before. It will face serious problems in coping with the pressures of the election year if it pursues confrontation with the MMA and the ARD.

Musharraf now has three major options.

One, he can allow the PML leadership to repair the relationship with the MMA by amending the WPB to their satisfaction. While Musharraf has signed the bill into law, any rapprochement with the MMA, for which the Chaudhrys are trying hard, can be effected through an amendment. Also, the federal government can assure them that their political interests in NWFP and Balochistan will be adequately protected.

Two, the government can refuse to accommodate the two opposition alliances and go for elections under the PML and its allies. The chief ministers of the Punjab and Sindh appear confident that they can take on both alliances in the next general elections.

Three, accommodation with the PPP can create an informal understanding between pro-Musharraf elements in the PML and the PPP. The PML members averse to the PPP are expected to seek new partnerships. Some of the ARD parties, especially the PMLN, may also seek new alignments.

The second option of a solo PML flight in the elections is not a viable one because a policy of confrontation with all the opposition groups is a risky strategy. In this case the opposition is not going to wait for elections. They are likely to question the holding of elections under Musharraf and resort to street agitation. That will make it difficult for the government to hold credible elections.

Musharraf is then left with two options: either to revive the government’s ties with the MMA or cultivate new partnership with the PPP, if not the ARD. These options have implications for his domestic politics and interaction with the international system. Further, any partnership with either alliance presupposes that he will quit as army chief and revert to the limited role of the presidency as set out in the constitution. These are difficult decisions. The longer Musharraf delays these decisions the greater will be the political cost for him and the country as a whole.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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